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“EVERYBODY IS MAKING LOVE/OR ELSE EXPECTING 
RAIN”: CONSIDERING THE SEXUAL AUTONOMY 
RIGHTS OF PERSONS INSTITUTIONALIZED BECAUSE 
OF MENTAL DISABILITY IN FORENSIC HOSPITALS 
AND IN ASIA 
Michael L. Perlin* 
Abstract: One of the most controversial policy questions in all of institutional mental 
disability law is the extent to which patients in psychiatric hospitals have a right to voluntary 
sexual interaction. The resolution of this matter involves difficult and sensitive questions of 
law, social policy, clinical judgment, politics, religion, and family structures. As difficult as 
these questions are in cases involving civil hospitals, the difficulties are exacerbated when 
the topic is the application of the right in forensic hospitals. Such facilities typically house 
individuals involved in the criminal-justice system: who may be incompetent to stand trial; 
who have been found incompetent to stand trial; who have been found not guilty by reason of 
insanity; or in some cases, who have been convicted of crimes. The legal statuses of these 
populations raise public concerns such as the extent to which they are entitled to exercise 
civil rights while institutionalized, and the potential additional danger that might be 
associated with the granting of sexual freedom to these populations. 
Additional difficulties are presented when we consider the application of this right in 
both civil and forensic hospitals in Asia, where the notion of “patients’ rights” regrettably 
lags far behind the construction of such rights in Western nations. How different would my 
conclusions be if I were looking at these issues from an international perspective? And what 
impact, if any, would the new United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (U.N. Convention) have on my answer? 
It is impossible to meaningfully come to grips with the multiple issues presented in this 
Article without also dealing with the social attitude of sanism, an irrational prejudice of the 
same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected in) 
prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. Sanism infects 
both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices; it is largely invisible and largely socially 
acceptable, based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and 
deindividualization. It is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common 
                                                     
* The author presented an earlier draft of a portion of this Article at the North London Forensic 
Service’s Tenth International Conference Queens’ College, Cambridge, on “Sex Matters: Sexual 
Offending and Sexuality in Forensic Psychiatry” (September 2007). He wishes to thank the 
participants at that conference (especially Lynne Edwards, Nikki DeTaranto, Jean Ruane and 
Belinda Brookes-Gordon) for their insightful and helpful comments on that draft. He also wishes to 
single out and thank Heather Ellis Cucolo for her courageous approach to these issues, and to thank 
Naomi Weinstein for her invaluable, beyond-the-call-of-duty research assistance. 
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sense” and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious response to events both in everyday life and 
in the legal process. 
This Article will (1) discuss the state of the law that applies to sexual autonomy in 
psychiatric institutions, (2) review the social policy issues as they relate to (a) forensic 
patients and (b) Asia, (3) explain the pernicious impact of sanism, and (4) seek to offer some 
tentative solutions to the underlying dilemmas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past fifteen years, I have frequently spoken about issues 
related to psychiatric patient sexuality. I have grown accustomed to the 
“There he goes again!” eye-rolling I get from colleagues when I tell 
them that I write and think about the issues related to institutionalized 
patients having sex. When I first worked on this topic, I led with this 
observation in the introduction to my oral presentation,1 and I assure 
you, nothing much has changed since then. But I have gotten older and 
wiser (well, older) so my response is much cooler than it used to be.2 
But back then—and until very recently—I focused solely on what 
would probably be seen as the most benign population to consider: civil 
patients in psychiatric hospitals. How would people react if this inquiry 
were “jumpshifted” into a discourse about other populations? Back then, 
I also focused solely on the domestic aspects of this question. How 
different would my conclusions be if I were looking at these issues from 
an international perspective? Finally, what impact, if any, would the new 
                                                     
1. See Michael L. Perlin, “Limited in Sex, They Dare”: Attitudes Toward Issues of Patient 
Sexuality, 26 AM. J. FOR. PSYCH. 25, 34 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, Limited] (quoting Michael L. 
Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”: Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 683, 714 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Lepers]). 
2. For one pointed exchange, see Perlin, Limited, supra note 1, at 38–39: 
I spoke about this topic at a major New York hospital, and thought it worthy to note that, at the 
time, only two law professors showed any interest in this topic: myself and Professor Susan 
Stefan . . . . An audience member jumped up, and said, “No, Professor. What’s much more 
interesting is why you and Professor Stefan are so obsessed with this topic.” (I responded to 
him by reaching my hand into my jacket pocket, pulling out an envelope, and saying, “Here’s 
my honorarium. Would you like to do a session now?” When I got home and told the story to 
my wife [a psychotherapist], she said, “No, what you should have said is, ‘Actually, doctor, the 
more interesting question is why you are so obsessed with what you perceive as my 
obsession.’” She has always thought better on her feet than I do . . . ). 
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United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities3 
(U.N. Convention) have on my answer? 
To begin with, sexual behavior is inextricably intertwined with 
“custom, tradition, and taboo.”4 A consultant to Disabled Women’s 
Health Policy and Programs has written that “disabled people are sexual 
minority members, due to . . . the presence of the threat in our nurture 
and nature.”5 A recent experience reflects these attitudes. Last summer, I 
attended the International Academy of Law and Mental Health Congress 
in Padua, Italy. At that conference, a colleague (and former student of 
mine), New York Law School Adjunct Professor Heather Ellis Cucolo, 
gave a fascinating, thoughtful, and balanced talk, Right to Sex in the 
Treatment and Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent Predators, as part of 
a panel called Disability Rights and the Law.6 The reactions were 
astounding. One of her co-panelists sat, rocked back and forth, becoming 
redder and redder in the face until I feared she was headed for aneurism 
territory. The man next to me in the audience began to draw concentric 
circles on a yellow pad, making the circles smaller and smaller, writing 
harder and harder until the nib of his pencil broke (I will omit any 
Freudian interpretation . . . ). One woman walked out in what I would 
call in “high dudgeon.” On the other hand, some of us in the audience 
were transfixed, delighted that Professor Cucolo had tackled this most 
taboo of taboos. 
Baseball fans know the meaning of the phrase “swinging a weighted 
bat.” When a player awaits his turn to bat, he often swings a weighted 
bat; that is, a bat injected with a metallic substance to make it much 
heavier than the regulation bat. The actual bat he swings in the game 
then gives the illusion of being much lighter than it is. To some extent, 
Professor Cucolo’s talk was the “weighted bat” for me. If you keep her 
talk in mind, the topics I address in this Article—the sexual autonomy of 
                                                     
3. G.A. Res. A/61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
4. Tomris Türmen, Reproductive Rights: How to Move Forward?, 4 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 31, 32 
(2000). 
5. Barbara Waxman Fiduccia, Current Issues in Sexuality and the Disability Movement, 18 
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 167, 169 (2000) (emphasis added). See Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,” 
46 SMU L. REV. 373, 389 (1992) (“From the beginning of recorded history, mental illness has been 
inextricably linked to sin, evil, God’s punishment, crime, and demons.”) [hereinafter Perlin, On 
Sanism]. 
6. See FINAL PROGRAM, XXXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH  
(June 25, 2007), at 28, available at http://www.ialmh.org/Padua2007/Final_Program.doc, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n6.pdf. 
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forensic patients7 and the sexual autonomy of patients in Asia8—should 
not seem quite so beyond the pale. 
Of course, that might just be silly on my part. For if the sexuality of a 
civil patient population in the United States is still “a public policy 
question as controversial as they get,”9 how then do we begin to 
approach the questions of whether forensic patients or patients in Asian 
nations have these rights? Additionally, if we begin to slide into the 
morass of “cultural relativism” in discussing whether there is, or should 
be, a uniquely Asian perspective,10 the entire enterprise becomes even 
more challenging. But that is no reason to skirt the issue. 
The resolution of these matters involves difficult and sensitive 
questions of law, social policy, clinical judgment, politics, religion, and 
family structures. Again, as difficult as these questions are in cases 
involving civil hospitals, the difficulties are exacerbated when 
discussing the application of these rights in forensic hospitals. Such 
facilities typically house individuals involved in the criminal-justice 
system: people who may be incompetent to stand trial; who have been 
found to be incompetent to stand trial; who have been found not guilty 
by reason of insanity; or in some cases, who have been convicted of 
crimes.11 The statuses of the populations in question raise public 
concerns about the extent to which they are entitled to exercise civil 
rights while institutionalized,12 and the potential additional danger that 
might be associated with granting them sexual freedom.13 As I have 
already noted, the problems that we face in grappling with this issue in 
the West are further heightened in the context of Asian culture. 
                                                     
7. A population that has always been afforded less autonomy and fewer liberty rights than the 
universe of civil patients. 
8. Asia is the only region of the world where there is no regional human-rights court or 
commission in operation, and a region in which issues of sexual autonomy have often been off the 
table as a matter of political and social discourse. 
9. Michael L. Perlin, Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last 
Frontier?, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 517, 520 (1994) (quoting Rob Karwath, Mental 
Center Sex Rule Studied, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 9, 1989, at 1). 
10. See infra Part II.B. 
11. See generally Michael L. Perlin, “For the Misdemeanor Outlaw”: The Impact of the ADA on 
the Institutionalization of Criminal Defendants with Mental Disabilities, 52 ALA. L. REV. 193 
(2000). On the procedural-due-process rights of convicted persons in forensic facilities, see, for 
example, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). 
12. See generally 2 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL,        
§§ 3C-1 to 9.2a, at 386–493 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing, inter alia, procedural and substantive rights 
of persons in forensic facilities). 
13. See id. §§ 3C-5 to 5.2, at 416–21. 
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It is impossible to meaningfully come to grips with the multiple issues 
that I am raising here without also coming to grips with the social 
attitude of sanism. Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality 
and character as other irrational prejudices that cause (and are reflected 
in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic 
bigotry.14 It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices, 
is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable, and is based 
predominantly upon stereotype, myth, superstition, and 
deindividualization. It is sustained and perpetuated by our use of alleged 
“ordinary common sense” and heuristic reasoning in an unconscious 
response to events both in everyday life and in the legal process.15 Only 
if we contextualize our attitudes toward patient sexuality within the 
fabric of our sanist society can we begin to come to grips with the 
problem at hand.16 
In this Article, I will (1) discuss the state of the law that applies to 
sexual autonomy in psychiatric institutions; (2) review the social policy 
issues as they relate to (a) forensic patients, and (b) patients in Asia; (3) 
explain the pernicious impact of sanism; and (4) offer some tentative 
solutions to the underlying dilemmas. The issues before us are ones that 
we have been, as a society, all too willing to ignore; however, changes in 
social attitudes and changes in the law (as reflected in the U.N. 
Convention) require us to turn our attention—seriously—to this matter. 
The title for this Article comes from Bob Dylan’s towering 
masterpiece, Desolation Row.17 The song has been characterized by 
critics as an “image of the world . . . far removed from marches toward 
social progress,”18 and as an example of “unjust condemnation of the 
sensitive, isolated individual striving for transcendence by a society out 
of touch with reality or moral truth that forces conformity to its own 
arbitrary and absurd rules based on the selfish desires and fantasies of 
                                                     
14. See generally Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5. 
15. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000); 
Michael L. Perlin, “Half-Wracked Prejudice Leaped Forth”: Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and 
How Mental Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3 (1999). 
16. See infra Part III. 
17. BobDylan.com, Desolation Row, http://bobdylan.com/moderntimes/songs/desolation.html 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2008), permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
83washlrev481n17.pdf. 
18. ROBERT SHELTON, NO DIRECTION HOME: THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BOB DYLAN 283 (Beech 
Tree Books 1997). 
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those in possession of power . . . .”19 Perhaps, as Adam Lively has 
described it, the song is “a repository for all the world’s accumulated 
hopes, fears, nightmares, and other dreams . . . . the ultimate testing-
ground of human experience.”20 
Desolation Row is a “deliberate cultural jumble”21 built on “general 
deviance.”22 So too has mental disability law become a jumbled law 
seeking to remediate “general deviance” in a way that is similarly “far 
removed from marches toward social progress.” Dylan’s lyric 
“Everybody is making love/Or else expecting rain” serves as a perfect 
metaphor for the topic that I am discussing here.23 
I.  THE STATE OF THE LAW 
Remarkably (or perhaps not so remarkably), there is virtually no law 
on the books that deals with this precise topic. Some American 
jurisdictions have enacted “patients’ bills of rights” providing a broad 
array of civil rights and liberties for persons institutionalized in 
psychiatric hospitals.24 Most of these laws flow from the historic and 
monumental decision Wyatt v. Stickney.25 Wyatt found a broad-based 
right to treatment for institutionalized mental patients.26 Despite this 
                                                     
19. Anonymous, Desolation Row, http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/2667/desolati.html 
(last visited Oct. 26, 2008), permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n19.pdf. 
20. Adam Lively, Adolescence Now, in THE DYLAN COMPANION: A COLLECTION OF ESSENTIAL 
WRITING ABOUT BOB DYLAN 198, 208 (Elizabeth Thomson & David Gutman eds. 1990). 
21. Frank Kermode & Stephen Spender, The Metaphor at the End of the Funnel, in THE DYLAN 
COMPANION, supra note 20, at 155, 158. 
22. Id. at 159. 
23. A full-scale analysis of Dylan’s metaphors is beyond the scope of this Article. My sense—
honed by having listened to this song hundreds and hundreds of times, and having seen Dylan 
perform it on at least a dozen occasions—is that the alternative “or else expecting rain” suggests the 
barrenness of a world without sex and love, but always within a context of political change and 
revolution. On the other hand, at least one author has argued that at the heart of Desolation Row is 
an exploration of “the erotic relationship [that] must be governed by a keeping of promises.” Adam 
Gearey, Outlaw Blues: Law in the Songs of Bob Dylan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1401, 1406–07 
(1999). I disagree with Gearey, and believe that Desolation Row is, at heart, a profoundly political 
song. 
24. See 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, §§ 3A-14 to 3A-14.5a, at 125–48 (discussing state-level 
patients’ bills of rights). 
25. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th 
Cir. 1974); see generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, §§ 3A–3.1 to 3A–3.2d, at 24–57. 
26. Wyatt, 344 F. Supp. at 381. I discuss this aspect of Wyatt in Perlin, supra note 9, at 529, and 
in Michael L. Perlin, “Make Promises by the Hour”: Sex, Drugs, the ADA, and Psychiatric 
Hospitalization, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 947, 965–66 (1997) [hereinafter Perlin, Promises]. See 
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ruling, only a few jurisdictions follow the lead of Wyatt and mandate a 
limited right to sexual interaction,27 and in at least one of these laws, 
there are limitations for forensic patients.28 Of the important post-Wyatt 
cases, forensic patients were part of the plaintiff class only in the Ohio 
case of Davis v. Watkins.29 Much of the case law ignores forensic 
patients entirely. The leading U.S. case, Foy v. Greenblott,30 deals with a 
civil patient in a locked ward.31 
All of this leads, logically, to the next question: since we are, by all 
accounts, a fairly litigious group of people, why has this area—one that 
deals with the most personal of rights32—not been the subject of greater 
                                                     
generally Michael L. Perlin et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Mentally Disabled Persons: Hopeless Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 80, 82 (1995) (“[P]atients’ bills of rights in almost all states have 
established baseline civil rights governing the substantive and procedural limitations on the 
involuntary civil commitment process, the right to treatment, and the right to refuse treatment.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
27. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. § 53-21-142(10) (2005) (“Patients have the right to be provided, 
with adequate supervision, suitable opportunities for interaction with members of the opposite sex 
except to the extent that a professional person in charge of the patient’s treatment plan writes an 
order stating that such interaction is inappropriate to the treatment regimen.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
30:4-24.2(e)(10) (West 1975) (“[Patients have the right] [t]o suitable opportunities for interaction 
with members of the opposite sex, with adequate supervision.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
5122.29(I) (West 2000) (guaranteeing a patient’s “right to social interaction with members of either 
sex, subject to adequate supervision, unless such social interaction is specifically withheld under a 
patient’s written treatment plan for clear treatment reasons”). 
28. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(C)(1) & (2). Typically, forensic patients are afforded 
fewer civil rights than are civil patients, and they are housed in facilities that provide less personal 
autonomy. See also Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Mental 
Disability Law: The Universal Factors, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 333, 354–55 (2007). 
Virtually all studies and reports referred to in this article have focused on the status (and plight) 
of civil patients: those whose commitments to the mental health system were not occasioned by 
arrest or other involvement in the criminal court process. Depressingly, persons in the forensic 
system generally receive—if this even seems possible—less humane services than do civil 
patients. 
See id. at 354 (footnote omitted). 
29. 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1201–02 (N.D. Ohio 1974). Davis, like most of Wyatt’s early progeny, 
was brought in the early 1970s, at a time when the idea that patients at psychiatric hospitals had a 
broad array of civil rights was an entirely new (and controversial) development. See, e.g., 2 PERLIN, 
supra note 12, § 3A–3.1, at 24–32. At this time, the expansion of any of these rights to individuals 
in forensic facilities was simply not “on the table” in most jurisdictions, the Davis litigation being a 
rare exception. See id. § 3A–3.3, at 57–59. 
30. 190 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 (Ct. App. 1983). 
31. I discuss the significance of Foy in Perlin, supra note 9, at 532–33, in Perlin, Promises, supra 
note 26, at 967, and in 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 3C-5.1, at 416–21. 
32. This is especially ironic in that we acknowledge the significance of sexual autonomy in 
related areas of law, but we ignore it here. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 531 (“The law acknowledges 
that sexual desire is a sufficiently important personal trait so that its diminution must be weighed 
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scrutiny, in court decrees, or even in substantial scholarly writings?33 
Although there has been attention paid to this issue in nursing and 
psychiatric literature,34 there has been virtually no carryover to the 
question of the legal implications of our policies, or the lack of such 
policies.35 
An examination of key documents in international human-rights law, 
on the other hand, provides us with some tantalizing possibilities. 
Consider variously: (1) the “right to freedom of association with others” 
from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;36 (2) the 
express application of these rights to persons with mental disabilities in 
the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for 
the Improvement of Mental Health Care;37 and (3) language in the new 
                                                     
into the formulation of a medication refusal policy. Yet the law simultaneously denies the power 
and importance of sexual desire with respect to hospital ward life.”). 
33. The only modern law review article on the global issue of mental patient sexuality published 
in the United States, other than those that I have written, is Winiviere Sy, The Right of 
Institutionalized Disabled Patients to Engage in Consensual Sexual Activity, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 
541 (2001). For a transnational perspective, see Hella von Unger, The Meaning and Management of 
Women’s Sexuality in Psychiatric vs. Community-Psychiatric Settings in Berlin, Germany (June 26, 
2007) (unpublished paper). Dr. Unger’s paper was presented at the Thirtieth International Congress 
on Law and Mental Health, in Padua, Italy. See supra note 6. 
34. See, e.g., May Dobal & Diana Torkelson, Sexual Rights of Persons with Serious and 
Persistent Mental Illness: Gathering Evidence for Decision Making, 5 J. AM. PSYCHIATRIC NURSES 
ASS’N 150 (1999); May Dobal & Diana Torkelson, Making Decisions About Sexual Rights in 
Psychiatric Facilities, 18 ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 68 (2004) [hereinafter Dobal & 
Torkelson, Decisions]; Eddie McCann, Exploring Sexual and Relationship Possibilities for People 
with Psychosis: A Review of the Literature, 10 J. PSYCHIATRIC & MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 640 
(2003); Ronald Stevenson, Sexual Medicine: Why Psychiatrists Must Talk to Their Patients About 
Sex, 49 CAN. J. PSYCH. 673 (2004). For an earlier sociological inquiry into the relationship between 
social attractiveness and staff attitudes toward patients, see Edmund G. Doherty, Social 
Attractiveness and Choice Among Psychiatric Patients and Staff: A Review, 12 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 279 (1971). 
35. See Perlin, Last Frontier, supra note 9, at 532 (“[M]any hospitals remain reluctant to 
promulgate such policies . . . .”). But see Dobal & Torkelson, Decisions, supra note 34, at 72 
(explaining that fifty-six percent of hospitals polled reported having such policies). 
36. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 22, Mar. 23, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm, permanent copy available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n36.pdf. 
37. See G.A. Res. 46/119, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/119 (Dec. 17, 1991). Although these Principles 
are now superseded by the U.N. Convention, they retain both historical and symbolic significance. 
Also, they have been cited as persuasive authority in leading cases on institutional rights and mental 
disability law. See, e.g., Victor Rosario Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report 
No. 63/99, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.102, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 54 n.8 (1999): 
The UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness are regarded as the most 
complete standards for protection of the rights of persons with mental disability at the 
international level. These Principles serve as a guide to States in the design and/or reform of 
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U.N. Convention that mandates nations to “[p]rovide persons with 
disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of free or 
affordable health care and programmes as provided to other persons, 
including in the area of sexual and reproductive health and population-
based public health programmes.”38 All of these documents provide 
potential ammunition for those seeking to secure rights for this class of 
individuals. 
But it is all, as should be clear, vividly speculative, since to the best of 
my knowledge, these issues have never been raised in litigation.39 My 
research also fails to reveal any cases on point in any Asian nation, a 
topic to which I will return later. The answer to why there has been so 
little consideration of these issues lies in a consideration of the 
underlying social policy issues. 
II.  SOCIAL POLICY ISSUES 
There are multiple issues of social policy embedded in this discussion 
that contribute to the paucity of attention paid to these issues. First, I will 
discuss the issues that relate more specifically to forensic patients. 
Second, I will discuss those that may have the greatest relevance to a 
consideration of these issues in an Asian context. 
A.  Issues Endemic to Forensic Patients 
There are clusters of issues that are particularly pertinent in the cases 
of forensic patients: (1) those that flow from societal fears of persons 
whose connection to the mental health system originates from 
involvement in the criminal-justice system; (2) the ways in which those 
fears have led to societal short-sightedness in our approach to these 
problems; and (3) the rights that such patients have, in spite of these 
social attitudes.  
                                                     
mental health systems and are of utmost utility in evaluating the practices of existing systems. 
Mental Health Principle 23 establishes that each State must adopt the legislative, judicial, 
administrative, educational, and other measures that may be necessary to implement them. 
(English translation available in MICHAEL L. PERLIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
COMPARATIVE MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 809–22 (2006) [hereinafter PERLIN, HUMAN RIGHTS]). I 
discuss the significance of the Congo case in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, An Internet-Based 
Mental Disability Law Program: Implications for Social Change in Nations with Developing 
Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 435, 448 (2007). 
38. G.A. Res. A/61/106, supra note 3, art. 25. 
39. On the relationship between international law and the rights of persons with mental 
disabilities, see generally PERLIN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37. 
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1.  Fears 
Fears about patient sexuality emanate from stereotype-driven 
misperceptions about patients’ dangerousness, from worries about a 
public backlash, and from long-documented overreactions on the part of 
hospital administrative staff to the specter of litigation. 
a.  A Heightened Fear of Increased Danger Because of the Fact That 
the Patients Are Forensic Patients40 
The assumption, of course, is that patients in forensic hospitals are 
more dangerous than those in civil hospitals and, perhaps directly as a 
result of this assumption, are less “worthy” of having “privileges,”41 
and/or require greater social control. But this attitude—which appears to 
be nearly universal—is based on an assumption that such patients are 
more dangerous than the norm. In many jurisdictions, if a patient is 
involved in any way with the criminal-justice system, he or she is 
automatically housed in the most secure forensic facility no matter the 
underlying charge or his individual risk assessment.42 This 
administrative decision—one that is rarely noted and even more rarely 
challenged43—creates a systemic bias as to all forensic patients, 
improperly eliminating the need for individualized risk assessments.44 
                                                     
40. I consider the implications of this false assumption in the context of the non-discrimination 
principles of the Americans with Disabilities Act in Perlin, supra note 11. 
41. See Rex D. Glensy, Quasi-Global Social Norms, 38 CONN. L. REV. 79, 118 (2005) (“Perhaps 
because of its empowering nature, throughout the centuries, individuals and governments have 
persistently tried to deny liberty to others, either indiscriminately or by picking and choosing 
categories of people whom are deemed worthy or unworthy of enjoying its privileges.”). 
42. See Perlin, supra note 11, at 201–02. 
43. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 812 S.W.2d 107, 110–11 (Ark. 1991); Moten v. Commonwealth, 
374 S.E.2d 704, 705 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); State v. LeFlore, 537 N.W.2d 148, No. 94-1825-CR, 1995 
WL 366220, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 9, 1995) (unpublished table opinion); State v. Phillips, 458 
N.W.2d 388, No. 89-1010, 1990 WL 95989, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 1990) (unpublished table 
opinion). 
44. Cf. Clare Dwyer, Risk, Politics and the “Scientification” of Political Judgement, 47 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 779, 783 (2007) (“As a result of the changing population within the prisons, policy 
and risk assessment became concerned with political as opposed to individual risk factors.”). 
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b.  A Heightened Fear of Adverse Publicity on the Part of Institutional 
Administrators if They Were to Countenance Such Behavior45 
I tell my Mental Disability Law students that the most important 
mental health policymaker in New York City is the front-page-headline 
writer for the New York Post, our most garish and outrageous tabloid (I 
am confident readers can fill in the appropriate parallel from their home 
towns). All of mental disability law is influenced by the pernicious 
power of the vividness heuristic: a cognitive simplifying device that 
teaches us that “when decisionmakers are in the thrall of a highly salient 
event, that event will so dominate their thinking that they will make 
aggregate decisions that are overdependent on the particular event and 
that overestimate the representativeness of that event within some larger 
array of events.”46 Writing about the high-publicity infanticide cases of 
Andrea Yates and Susan Smith, I said this about the power of the 
vividness effect: “[T]o the best of my knowledge, little has been written 
about the ways that the publicity given to one case involving a specific 
mental condition has led to a significant sea change in the ways that 
subsequent jurors decide cases involving defendants with a similar 
mental condition.”47 It should be no surprise that this has a particularly 
onerous impact on this area of law and policy. 
c.  The Fear of Tort Litigation That Concomitantly Ignores Potential 
Tort Exposure for Maintaining the Status Quo Ante 
Fear of tort-based litigation has led to over-confinement48 and overuse 
                                                     
45. For a discussion of this in the contexts of sexually-violent-predator laws, see Michael L. 
Perlin, “There’s No Success like Failure/and Failure’s No Success at All”: Exposing the 
Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 NW. U.L. REV. 1247, 1258 n.62 (1998) [hereinafter Perlin, 
No Success], and of competency-to-stand-trial cases, see Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental 
Disability Law: The Case of Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625, 638 n.56 (1993) [hereinafter 
Perlin, Pretexts]. 
46. Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 895 (2006). I discuss 
the vividness heuristic in the context of mental disability law in, inter alia, Michael L. Perlin, “She 
Breaks Just Like a Little Girl”: Neonaticide, the Insanity Defense, and the Irrelevance of “Ordinary 
Common Sense,” 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 4 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, She Breaks]; 
Michael L. Perlin, “The Executioner’s Face Is Always Well-Hidden”: The Role of Counsel and the 
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 231 (1996); Michael L. Perlin, The 
Sanist Lives of Jurors in Death Penalty Cases: The Puzzling Role of “Mitigating” Mental Disability 
Evidence, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y. 239, 271 (1994). I discuss it specifically in 
the context of sexual autonomy in Perlin, supra note 9, at 536 n.118. 
47. Perlin, She Breaks, supra note 46, at 2. 
48. See Perlin, supra note 11, at 231. 
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of restraints,49 notwithstanding a robust collection of cases that have 
found liability in cases involving improper commitment50 or improper 
use of restraints.51 Many times when I have talked about this general 
topic, audience members have expressed a fear of litigation. I posed the 
question this way in an earlier article: 
[H]ow will the well-documented fear of many mental health 
professionals of being sued—what some commentators term 
“litigaphobia”52—affect the adoption of, or compliance with, 
any policy that appears to increase the potential for patients’ 
sexual activity (for fear that litigation might quickly follow 
unwanted births or the spread of sexually transmitted 
diseases)?53 
This fear ignores the possibility that patients might sue for violations 
of their state statutory rights, federal Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) rights, or international human rights, triggered by a deprivation 
of sexual autonomy.54 This is a possibility never discussed in this policy 
debate.55 
                                                     
49. See Michael L. Perlin, The Regulation of the Use of Seclusion and Restraints in Mental 
Disability Law, http://www.narpa.org/regulation.of.seclusion.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2008), 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n49.pdf. See 
generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 3B-10.6 for a summary of cases dealing with restraint and 
seclusion issues. 
50. See, e.g., 3 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 7A-6.3, at 345–50 (citing and discussing cases). 
51. See id., § 7A-6.4f, at 363–64 (citing and discussing cases). 
52. To my knowledge, the term “litigaphobia” was coined by Stanley Brodsky. See Stanley L. 
Brodsky, Fear of Litigation in Mental Health Professionals, 15 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 492, 497 
(1988) (discussing the overreaction of mental health professionals to the risk of malpractice 
litigation). I discuss litigaphobia in a tort-law “duty to protect” context in Michael L. Perlin, 
Tarasoff and the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990’s, 16 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 29, 61–62 (1992). 
53. Perlin, supra note 9, at 525–26 (footnotes omitted). 
54. Compare, for example, Foy v. Greenblott, 190 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Ct. App. 1983), where an 
institutionalized patient and her infant child sued the mother’s treating doctor for failure to maintain 
proper supervision to either prohibit her from having sex or to provide her with contraceptive 
devices. On how this phenomenon dominates policy in the area of seclusion-and-restraint law, see 
Perlin, supra note 49. 
55. If the U.N. Convention—rich with positive social rights—is eventually ratified by Congress 
and signed by the President, the resolution of this policy dilemma may eventually be altered, and the 
enhancement of individual rights and autonomy might eventually come to be seen as the preferred 
approach. 
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2.  Short-Sightedness 
Failure to take seriously issues of patient sexual autonomy is self-
defeating. It ignores the reality that most patients will be reintegrated 
into a community in which sexuality is an important component, and it 
stems from our discomfort with even defining “sex.” 
a.  A Failure to Consider That the Opportunity to Engage in an 
Intimate Relationship May Be Critical to a Patient’s Adjustment to 
the Outside World Once Released56 
When I first wrote about patient sexuality, I noted a significant issue: 
the opportunity to take part in intimate relationships may be critical to a 
patient’s successful reintegration into the outside world.57 Professor 
Cucolo has focused on this in her recent work on sex offenders. She asks 
why we fail to acknowledge that the concept of intimacy is “the key to 
preventing and minimizing re-offense.”58 This is a reality that must be 
considered as we further explore this issue.59 
The literature is clear: we impose significant barriers that prevent 
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities from establishing 
intimacy.60 Yet, one study showed that most patients in high-security 
hospitals “valu[ed] being in a caring relationship [while] in the hospital,” 
and that there was likely “an ongoing desire for intimacy regardless of 
gender, diagnosis or offense group.”61 
                                                     
56. See, e.g., W.L. Marshall et al., The Enhancement of Intimacy and the Reduction of Loneliness 
Among Child Molesters, 11 J. FAMILY VIOLENCE 219, 220 (1996) (“[I]ntimacy deficits and 
loneliness are linked to actual offending . . . .”). 
57. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 524 (“Is it clinically beneficial or antitherapeutic to allow 
institutionalized patients autonomy in sexual decision making? In answering this question, to what 
extent ought we consider research on the therapeutic value of touching and physical intimacy?”) 
(citing, inter alia, ASHLEY MONTAGU, TOUCHING: THE HUMAN SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SKIN (1971); 
H.F. Harlow et al., From Thought to Therapy: Lessons from a Primate Laboratory, 59 AM. 
SCIENTIST 538 (1971)). 
58. Heather Ellis Cucolo, Right to Sex in the Treatment and Civil Commitment of Sexual Violent 
Predators, (June 26, 2007) (unpublished paper), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/ 
notes/83washlrev481n58.pdf. Professor Cucolo’s findings were presented at the Thirtieth 
International Congress on Law and Mental Health in Padua, Italy. See supra note 6. 
59. See Doherty, supra note 34, at 283, 287 (discussing how interpersonal relationships among 
patients can help further treatment goals). 
60. See Judith A. Cook, Sexuality and People with Psychiatric Disabilities, 18 SEXUALITY & 
DISABILITY 195, 200 (2000). 
61. Heidi Hales et al., Sexual Attitudes, Experience and Relationships Amongst Patients in a High 
Security Hospital, 16 CRIM. BEHAV. & MENTAL HEALTH 254, 260 (2006). 
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b.  A Tension Between an Individual’s Right to Free Expression of 
Sexuality, and Concern That a Patient Might Act Coercively 
Toward Another Patient, Especially in a Mixed-Sex Ward 
This is the knottiest problem of all, and one that needs serious and 
sober thought. A forensic hospital, by definition, is a closed ward in 
most jurisdictions. Inside such a hospital, it may be more difficult to 
avoid contact with someone who is “sexually interested” than it often is 
in the “free world.” At least one federal appellate court has ruled that 
“there must be a fundamental constitutional right to be free from forced 
exposure of one’s person to strangers of the opposite sex when not 
reasonably necessary for some legitimate, overriding reason . . . .”62 
How may the right of institutionalized patients to be free from unwanted 
sexual attention be safeguarded in this context? Policymakers need to 
take this problem seriously in crafting any sort of protocol. When they 
do so, however, they should consider that the only recent study of 
sexuality in a high-security hospital concluded that there was “little 
evidence” of patients in that setting being coerced into sexual 
relationships.63 
It is not enough for hospital administrators to presume coercion, using 
that assumption as a basis for denying patients their right to free 
expression. They must instead carefully craft policies that protect 
individuals from “unwanted sexual attention” while still safeguarding 
autonomy. There is no evidence that this is an issue being taken 
seriously.64 
c.  A Failure to Define What We Actually Mean by “Sex” 
Without belaboring the obvious, what are we talking about when we 
say “sex”?65 Our failure to define and discuss sex reflects our social 
                                                     
62. Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1987). 
63. Hales et al., supra note 61, at 260. 
64. See, e.g., Harlan Spector, Should Psychiatric Hospital Patients Be Permitted to Have Sex?, 
THE PLAIN-DEALER, June 25, 2008, available at http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/06/should_ 
psychiatric_hospital_pa.html, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/ 
notes/83washlrev481n64.pdf (quoting a patients’ rights attorney questioning whether “women in 
psychiatric hospitals are even capable of consenting to sex”). 
65. See Sy, supra note 33, at 546 (discussing policies at Napa State Hospital in California that 
proscribe “open mouth kissing, oral stimulation of genitals (including breasts), anal stimulation or 
intercourse, sexual intercourse . . . promiscuous behavior . . . prolonged closed mouth kissing, 
intimate body to body contact, touching underneath clothing, touching of genitals (including 
breasts), exhibition of the body in any manner judged to be provocative and sexually 
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discomfort and squeamishness with this entire matter. Interestingly, in 
one of the few cases establishing any sort of right to sexual interaction, a 
federal court in Ohio held—gratuitously, apparently66—that Lima State 
Hospital patients have a right to be “provided counseling or other 
treatment for homosexuality.”67 Although this language does not appear 
to have been adopted by other courts (and the decision is well over thirty 
years old), I would not be so bold to predict that sexual-preference issues 
would pass entirely under the social radar if sexual autonomy rights 
were to be granted to forensic patients. 
3.  Rights 
Notwithstanding the fears and examples of short-sightedness 
catalogued above, the reality is that institutionalized persons with mental 
disabilities—including forensic patients—do have at least some right to 
sexual expression and autonomy. By rejecting this legal reality, public 
opinion creates a social disconnect and allows for an irrational universe 
in which the extent to which a patient’s rights may be vindicated may 
well rest on a triviality, such as which institution within the same 
geographic region of a state the patient is housed in.68 
a.  A Disconnect Between Potential Legal Sources That Might Support 
the Right69 and Public Opinion That Utterly Rejects That Position70 
It is not difficult for me to predict the level of public outrage if this 
idea were to be suggested by a politician. There was a movement to 
drum out of office the New York City Chancellor of Education when he 
                                                     
solicitous . . . .” (internal quotation and footnote omitted)); see also Perlin, supra note 9, at 527 
(“Does it make a difference if we are discussing monogamous heterosexual sex, polygamous 
heterosexual sex, monogamous homosexual sex, polygamous homosexual sex, or bisexual sex? 
Does sex mean intercourse? What about oral sex? Anal sex? Masturbation? Voyeurism? 
Exhibitionism?”) (footnotes omitted). 
66. There is no evidence that this issue was ever raised by either party in court pleadings or oral 
arguments. 
67. Davis v. Watkins, 384 F. Supp. 1196, 1208 (N.D. Ohio 1974). 
68. See infra text accompanying notes 72–74. 
69. I argue in Perlin, Promises, supra note 26, at 965–70, that this right is protected by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act. 
70. Compare Perlin, Limited, supra note 1, at 36 (“When I gave this talk at the Florida Institute of 
Mental Health (part of the University of South Florida in Tampa), an audience member (from the 
general public) leapt to his feet, and denounced me: ‘Professor Perlin, you are an agent of the 
devil!’”) with id. at 36–41 (discussing reactions to presentations on this topic in audiences more 
receptive than the general public). 
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said that condoms should be made available to high-school students.71 
The reaction to what I am discussing here would be, I expect, more 
intense. But that should not end the discussion. At the least, the idea that 
institutionalized psychiatric patients have some sexual autonomy rights 
should be tested in a court of law—an arm of government presumably 
less susceptible to the vicissitudes of public pressure than administrative 
agencies. 
b.  The Intra-Jurisdictional Inconsistencies That Often Accompany the 
Development of Institutional Sex Policies 
In her article about sexual activities in California institutions, 
Winiviere Sy points out the significant disparity between the restrictive 
policies at Napa State Hospital72 and the less restrictive ones at Sonoma 
Developmental Center.73 In at least one New York hospital, there have 
been different policies for male and female patients. Male patients 
leaving the facility on unsupervised community leave would be given 
condoms upon request. Female patients, on the other hand, had to have 
their competency (informally) assessed before birth-control pills could 
be prescribed.74 This makes no conceptual sense, of course, and is most 
likely a reflection of the head-in-the-sand way we approach the 
underlying issues.75 
B.  Issues Endemic to Asia76 
I found it very interesting that, when I told knowledgeable colleagues 
that I was writing this Article, they inevitably said, “Good luck with 
your research! You won’t find a thing [about this specific sub-topic].” 
                                                     
71. See Perlin, supra note 9, at 526 n.44. 
72. See supra note 33. 
73. Sy, supra note 33, at 547 (explaining that patients were allowed to engage “in activity 
directed to sexual arousal, because the expression of one’s sexuality is the right of every person”) 
(internal quotation and footnote omitted). 
74. Perlin, supra note 9, at 541. 
75. Much of the development of patients’ rights litigation over the past thirty-five years has gone 
to ensure that there are “individualized treatment plans” for each institutionalized individual. See 
generally 2 PERLIN, supra note 12, § 3A–3.1c. We totally ignore this when it comes to issues of 
sexuality. 
76. On the question of whether Asians are more likely to be civilly committed than are 
Caucasians, see S. Ali et al., Are Asians at Greater Risk of Compulsory Psychiatric Admission than 
Caucasians in the Acute General Adult Setting?, 47 MED. SCI. & L. 311 (2007) (discussing how 
Asian patients are significantly overrepresented as inpatients in some psychiatric hospitals). 
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Perhaps I have just been blessed to have a superb research assistant (it is 
always good to be lucky). But the reality is that my colleagues were 
wrong, and that there is some literature on this point, albeit to me, 
extraordinarily depressing literature.77 Before looking at that literature, 
though, I will first address the issue of “cultural relativism.” 
1.  Cultural Relativism 
Advocates of cultural relativism “claim that rights and rules about 
morality . . . are encoded in and thus depend on cultural context.”78 I 
believe that cultural relativism is an inappropriate approach to this 
question. I unequivocally endorse the arguments of Patrick Hui, writing 
about birth-control policies in China in the context of the United 
Nation’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW):79 “Cultural relativism is not sufficient 
justification for the denial of the universal application of human rights 
standards.”80 As Arati Rao has stated: “[T]he notion of culture favored 
by international actors must be unmasked for what it is: a falsely rigid, 
ahistorical, selectively chosen set of self-justificatory texts and practices 
whose patent partiality raises the question of exactly whose interests are 
being served and who comes out on top.”81 I begin with this position to 
                                                     
77. Most, but not all, of the information available in the English language is from China and 
Japan. I am hoping that the publication of this Article will spur interest in this topic in other Asian 
nations. 
78. Hirad Abtahi, Reflections on the Ambiguous Universality of Human Rights: Cyrus the Great’s 
Proclamation as a Challenge to the Athenian Democracy’s Perceived Monopoly on Human Rights, 
36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55, 56 (2007) (quoting HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 192 (1996)). 
79.  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 
34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979). 
80. Patrick T.C. Hui, Birth Control in China: Cultural, Gender, Socio-economic and Legislative 
Perspectives in Light of CEDAW Standards, 32 H.K.L.J. 187, 199 (2002); see also Joel Richard 
Paul, Cultural Resistance to Global Governance, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 13 n.51 (2000) (citing, 
inter alia, Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over Human 
Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109 (1998) (criticizing cultural relativism as 
deterministic and tautological)); Karen Engle, Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate 
in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 291 (2000) (same); Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, 
Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 MCGILL L.J. 743 (1996) (examining the problematic 
character of the cultural argument in the context of Asian human rights)). 
81. Arati Rao, The Politics of Gender and Culture in International Human Rights Discourse, in 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 167, 174 (Julie 
Peters & Andrea Wolper eds., 1995). For an anthropological perspective, see also Ann-Belinda S. 
Preis, Human Rights as Cultural Practice: An Anthropological Critique, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 286 
(1996) (rejecting cultural relativism). On deploying cross-cultural perspectives in this inquiry, see 
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preempt those who would reject the universality of human rights as they 
apply to all aspects of mental disability law.82 
2. Rights in China 
It is necessary to first look at China’s history of mandatory 
sterilization of persons with mental retardation. In the 1980s, laws were 
passed in Gansu province: first, forbidding individuals with “hereditary 
retardation” from having children,83 then, mandating sterilization for 
such individuals.84 Similar laws were enacted in other provinces, and 
within a few years, there were parallel laws in five other sectors, some 
forbidding marriage, some forbidding childbearing, and some mandating 
sterilization.85 These laws, which apply to one-third of China’s 
population, flowed in significant part from the predominant Chinese 
notion that mental disabilities were “inherited” diseases.86 
China’s 1994 Law on Maternal and Infant Health Care requires 
                                                     
Man Yee Karen Lee, Universal Human Dignity: Some Reflections in the Asian Context, 3 ASIAN J. 
COMP. L., Issue 1, art. 10, at 1 (2008). 
82. Cf. Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights and Comparative Mental Disability Law: 
The Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISR. L. REV. 69, 89–
92 (2006) (discussing societal blindness to ongoing violations of the international human-rights law 
of persons with mental disabilities); Perlin, supra note 28, at 333 (examining universal factors to 
determining international human-rights violations involving persons with mental disabilities); 
Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolution and 
Contemporary Challenges, in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Michael Dudley ed., 
forthcoming 2008) (discussing the history of the intersection—or lack thereof—of debates over 
human rights and disability rights), available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n82.pdf; Michael L. Perlin, “Through the 
Wild Cathedral Evening”: Barriers, Attitudes, Participatory Democracy, Professor tenBroek, and 
the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 413 (2008) [hereinafter 
Perlin, Wild Cathedral] (discussing literature on persons with mental disabilities and international 
human rights). 
83. See Linda Johnson, Expanding Eugenics or Improving Health Care in China: Commentary on 
the Provisions of the Standing Committee of the Gansu People’s Congress Concerning the 
Prohibition of Reproduction by Intellectually Impaired Persons, 24 J.L. & SOC’Y 199, 221–22 
(1997) (reprinting Provisions of the Standing Committee of the Gansu People’s Congress 
Concerning the Prohibition of Reproduction by Intellectually Impaired Persons, adopted Nov. 23, 
1988). 
84. Daniel S. Gewirtz, Toward a Quality Population: China’s Eugenic Sterilization of the 
Mentally Retarded, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139, 149 (1994). 
85. See Gewirtz, supra note 84, at 149; Matthew D. Martin III, The Dysfunctional Progeny of 
Eugenics: Autonomy Gone AWOL, 15 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 371, 408 (2007). 
86. See Gewirtz, supra note 84, at 149 (mental retardation perceived to be inherited); Johnson, 
supra note 83, at 226 n.38 (schizophrenia and manic depression presumed to be inheritable 
diseases). 
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premarital checkups to determine the presence of “relevant mental 
diseases,”87 defined as mental diseases that “may have an adverse effect 
on marriage and child-bearing.”88 The Chinese Marriage Law forbids 
marriage if either individual “is suffering from any disease that is 
regarded by medical science as rend[er]ing [sic] a person unfit for 
marriage,”89 a category regularly construed to include mental 
disabilities.90 Beyond that, the law adds that a marriage is invalid “if any 
party has suffered from any disease that is held by medical science as 
rend[er]ing [sic] a person unfit for getting married and the disease has 
not been cured after marriage.”91 
3.  Rights in Japan 
Although the state of affairs in Japan is not quite as bleak, an article 
considering the role of the disability-rights advocacy movement in that 
nation notes that individuals with disabilities “have been taught from an 
early age to accept as well as cherish their dependence on the care they 
receive from parents and institutions.”92 Scholars have begun to consider 
the negative social repercussions of principles of hierarchy and 
dependence in Japanese society,93 but they have paid little attention to 
the specific intersection between these principles and sexual autonomy. 
                                                     
87. Law of the People’s Republic of China on Maternal and Infant Health Care, art. 8(3), 
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383796.htm, permanent 
copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n87.pdf. 
88. Id. art. 7(3). 
89. Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 7(b), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=1793&keyword, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n89.pdf. 
90. See Xiaoqing Feng, A Review of the Development of Marriage Law in the People’s Republic 
of China, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 331, 337 (2002). 
91. Marriage Law of the People’s Republic of China, art. 10(c), available at 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/law/display.asp?db=1&id=1793&keyword, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n91.pdf. 
92. Katharina Heyer, From Special Needs to Equal Rights: Japanese Disability Law, 1 ASIAN-
PAC. L. & POL’Y J., Issue 1, at 1, 17 (1999). 
93. See, e.g., Taimie L.Bryant, For the Sake of the Country, For the Sake of the Family: The 
Oppressive Impact of Family Registration on Women and Minorities in Japan, 39 UCLA L. REV. 
109, 109 n.2 (1991) (citing, inter alia, TAKEO DOI, THE ANATOMY OF DEPENDENCE (1973) 
(discussing the role of presumption on the benevolence of hierarchical superiors in Japanese 
personality and society); Hiroshi Wagatsuma & Arthur Rosett, The Implications of Apology: Law 
and Culture in Japan and the United States, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 461 (1986) (discussing the 
intersection between various psychological features connected to hierarchical social organization 
and the legal system)). 
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These two portraits—a nation that seeks to suppress all sexuality in 
individuals with mental disabilities,94 and a nation that privileges 
institutional dependence—do not lead to much optimism as we consider 
the matter currently before us. However, I do not want to paint an 
entirely pessimistic picture, as there is some recognition of the problem. 
In supporting the need for a U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, delegates to an Asia-Pacific regional conference held 
in Bangkok in 2003 declared that “international human rights standards 
require that people with disabilities should enjoy the same basic human 
rights as all other human beings.”95 Sadly, this statement appears at odds 
with prevailing social and cultural norms as well as legislation in much 
of this region.96 The delegates noted that such persons are subjected to 
“widespread violations of their human rights,” including specifically, 
“forced sterilisation.”97 
The U.N. Convention and the Bangkok recommendations98 are 
encouraging. However, the backdrop of the Chinese and Japanese 
experiences remind us that realization of the rights set out in the 
Convention will not come easily.99 Advocates and activists in this area 
face barriers when seeking to articulate and implement an array of 
sexual autonomy rights for persons with mental disabilities. In short, this 
is not an easy question. 
III.  SANISM 
Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the same quality and character as 
other irrational prejudices that cause and are reflected in prevailing 
social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. It 
                                                     
94. Cf. Vanessa Torres Hernandez, Making Good on the Promise of International Law: The 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Inclusive Education in China and India, 
17 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 497 (2008) (concluding that China fails to provide universal education 
for children with disabilities). 
95. Bangkok Recommendations on the Elaboration of a Comprehensive and Integral 
International Convention to Promote and Protect the Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Disabilities (2003), available at http://www.worldenable.net/bangkok2003/recommendations.htm, 
permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n95.pdf  
[hereinafter Bangkok Recommendations]. 
96. Cf. Man-Chung Chiu, Development of an Indigenous Legal Theory of Sexual Justice in Hong 
Kong, 37 H.K.L.J. 775 (2007) (discussing the possibility of creating an indigenous legal theory of 
sexual justice in Hong Kong). 
97. See Bangkok Recommendations, supra note 95. 
98. See id. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 83–93. 
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permeates all aspects of mental disability law and affects all participants 
in the mental disability law system: litigants, fact-finders, counsel, and 
expert and lay witnesses.100 Its corrosive effects have warped mental 
disability jurisprudence in the law of involuntary civil commitment, 
institutional law, tort law, and all aspects of the criminal process 
(pretrial, trial, and sentencing).101 It reflects what civil-rights lawyer 
Florynce Kennedy has characterized the “pathology of oppression.”102 In 
earlier articles, I have explored the relationship between sanism and 
sexuality.103 If sanist myths, based on stereotypes, are the result of rigid 
categorization and overgeneralization, then they function 
psychologically to “localize our anxiety, to prove to ourselves that what 
we fear does not lie within.”104 We thus have labeled all individuals with 
mental illness as being “deviant, morally weak, sexually uncontrollable, 
[and] emotionally unstable.”105 And often, we (especially 
professionals)106 regard those with mental disabilities as being 
fundamentally different from us, lacking human qualities such as the 
needs for affection and dignified ways of expressing affection.107 
A.  Sanist Myths 
Our attitudes toward the sexuality of persons with mental disabilities 
reflect this labeling in this way: 
Society tends to infantilize the sexual urges, desires, and needs 
of the mentally disabled. Alternatively, they are regarded as 
possessing an animalistic hypersexuality, which warrants the 
imposition of special protections and limitations on their sexual 
behavior to stop them from acting on these “primitive” urges. 
                                                     
100. See Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5, at 398–405. 
101. See id. at 400–05. 
102. See Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment: Some Comments on Its Development, in 
MEDICAL, MORAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE 97, 107 (Frank J. Ayd, Jr. ed., 1974) 
(discussing Kennedy’s conception of sanism). 
103. See PERLIN, supra note 15; Perlin, Lepers, supra note 1; Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5. 
104. SANDER L. GILMAN, DIFFERENCE AND PATHOLOGY: STEREOTYPES OF SEXUALITY, RACE, 
AND MADNESS 240 (1985). 
105. Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5, at 383. 
106. Although I refer here primarily to mental health professionals, lawyers often mirror the same 
attitudes. See, e.g., Spector, supra note 64 (describing the chief lawyer for the nonprofit Nebraska 
Advocacy Services as questioning “whether women in psychiatric hospitals are even capable of 
consenting to sex”). On sanist behavior by lawyers, see generally Perlin, Lepers, supra note 1. 
107. See generally Perlin, Limited, supra note 1. 
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By focusing on alleged “differentness,” we deny their basic 
humanity and their shared physical, emotional, and spiritual 
needs. By asserting that theirs is a primitive morality, we allow 
ourselves to censor their feelings and their actions. By denying 
their ability to show love and affection, we justify this disparate 
treatment.108 
Think about the basic “sanist myths” that I have discussed previously 
in the specific context of this Article’s topic: 
1. Mentally ill individuals are “different,” and, perhaps, less than 
human. They are erratic, deviant, morally weak, sexually 
uncontrollable, emotionally unstable, superstitious, lazy, 
ignorant and demonstrate a primitive morality. They lack the 
capacity to show love or affection. They smell different from 
“normal” individuals, and are somehow worth less. 
2. Most mentally ill individuals are dangerous and frightening. 
They are invariably more dangerous than non-mentally ill 
persons, and such dangerousness is easily and accurately 
identified by experts. At best, people with mental disabilities are 
simple and content, like children. Either parens patriae or police 
power supply a rationale for the institutionalization of all such 
individuals. 
3. Mentally ill individuals are presumptively incompetent to 
participate in “normal” activities, to make autonomous decisions 
about their lives (especially in areas involving medical care), 
and to participate in the political arena. 
4. If a person in treatment for mental illness declines to take 
prescribed antipsychotic medication, that decision is an excellent 
predictor of (1) future dangerousness, and (2) need for 
involuntary institutionalization. 
5. Mental illness can easily be identified by lay persons and 
matches up closely to popular media depictions. It comports 
with our common sense notion of crazy behavior. 
6. It is, and should be, socially acceptable to use pejorative 
labels to describe and single out people who are mentally ill; this 
singling out is not problematic in the way that the use of 
pejorative labels to describe women, blacks, Jews or gays and 
lesbians might be. 
7. Mentally ill individuals should be segregated in large, distant 
                                                     
108. Perlin, supra note 9, at 537 (footnotes omitted). 
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institutions because their presence threatens the economic and 
social stability of residential communities. 
8. The mentally disabled person charged with crime is 
presumptively the most dangerous potential offender, as well as 
the most morally repugnant one. The insanity defense is used 
frequently and improperly as a way for such individuals to beat 
the rap; insanity tests are so lenient that virtually any mentally ill 
offender gets a free ticket through which to evade criminal and 
personal responsibility. The insanity defense should be 
considered only when the mentally ill person demonstrates 
objective evidence of mental illness. 
9. Mentally disabled individuals simply don’t try hard enough. 
They give in too easily to their basest instincts, and do not 
exercise appropriate self restraint. 
10. If “do-gooder,” activist attorneys had not meddled in the 
lives of people with mental disabilities, such individuals would 
be where they belong (in institutions), and all of us would be 
better off. In fact, there’s no reason for courts to involve 
themselves in all mental disability cases.109 
These myths contaminate those social policies that deal with and 
control the lives of persons with mental disabilities, especially 
institutionalized persons with mental disabilities. And they are most 
pernicious when it comes to issues of sexuality. 
B.  Sanism in Asia 
In China, these biases are more pronounced. A news report 
summarized what experts characterize as “the social view that is 
currently held by the general public in China”: “[Mentally retarded] 
people make no contribution to the society, are invisible shackles to their 
parents, cause great misery to themselves, and are a heavy burden to the 
country.”110 It is hard to imagine a more sanist sentence. 
These attitudes are exaggerated in other Asian cultures as well. A 
review of Malaysian law concludes that current Mayalsian mental-health 
legislation “reflects the stigmatizing approach toward the persons with 
mental illness that prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s,” an approach in 
                                                     
109. Perlin, Lepers, supra note 1, at 724–25 n.220. 
110. Hongjun Su & Don C. Van Dyke, Breaking the Silence and Overcoming the Invisibility: 
Down Syndrome in China, Part I, 20 INT’L PEDIATRICS 25, 28 (2005) (internal citation omitted). 
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which mental illness is viewed as a “purely biological aberration.”111 A 
Hong Kong study stressed: 
In Chinese societies, there is more severe stigma against 
individuals and thus relatives of mental health consumers, as 
Chinese culture attaches more importance to the collective 
representation of families, and having a mentally ill relative is 
considered something one should feel ashamed of, for it can 
imply an inferior origin of the family, failure of the parents, or 
even sin committed by ancestors.112 
The authors of the study concluded that this social stigma “has 
tremendous impacts on the recovery of individuals with mental illness in 
terms of employment, social resources, and availability of community-
based facilities.”113 The relationship between the legacy of this stigma—
feelings of shame and inferiority—and the repression of the sexuality of 
persons with mental disabilities in Asian cultures should be crystal 
clear.114 
C.  Influence of Sanism on Forensic Patients 
If there has ever been a special-interest group with no lobby, support 
system, political-action committee, or fan club, it is that of forensic 
psychiatric patients. It is a sure bet that at this moment there is no 
organized group of advocates whose “action agenda” leads off with, 
“Let’s make sure that forensic patients have a right to sex!” My research 
turns up nothing—not a single court case, article, or Internet mention—
that addresses this issue. 
Some of this state of affairs, this abject lack of interest, results in part 
from the policy dilemmas that I discussed earlier.115 However, even 
                                                     
111. A. Rahamuthulla Mubarak, Malaysia’s Social Policies on Mental Health: A Critical Theory, 
17 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL’Y 55, 59 (2003). Of course, there are many nations with no mental health 
law at all. See Perlin, supra note 28, at 337 (citing to recent report by the World Health 
Organization revealing that twenty-five percent of all nations in the world have no such law). 
112. Hector W.H. Tsang et al., Stigmatizing Attitudes Towards Individuals with Mental Illness in 
Hong Kong: Implications for Their Recovery, 31 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 383, 385 (2003); see 
generally MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 37 (1994) (“Ever 
since Prince Ptah-hotep attempted the first classification of mental illness almost five thousand 
years ago, conceptions of such illness have been inextricably linked to the notion of sin . . . .”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
113. Tsang et al., supra note 112, at 394. 
114. On the invisibility of persons with mental disabilities in China, illustrated by the treatment of 
those with Down Syndrome, see generally Su & Van Dyke, supra note 110. 
115. See supra Part II.A. 
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more of it results from the omnipresence of sanism. The peculiar 
interplay between sanism and sexuality—an interplay that I have 
discussed extensively in the past116—is particularly warped in 
considerations of the right of forensic patients to exercise sexual 
autonomy while institutionalized. 
Because of sanism, we attribute to all forensic patients an immutable 
and pernicious level of dangerousness—one that is constant, universal, 
and not subject to remediation. Because of sanism, we employ the 
vividness heuristic so as to typify all behaviors of all forensic patients, 
based on what some patients might do some of the time.117 Because of 
sanism, we blind ourselves to violations of constitutional and statutory 
rights (domestic and international) for fear of “bad publicity.” A review 
of my book, The Hidden Prejudice, made this point better than I could: 
It is likely many readers will have trouble staying “on the bus” 
with Perlin when they read Chapter Seven in which he argues 
for the right of institutionalized persons to have sexual 
interaction. Perhaps that proves Perlin’s point, however, about 
how extensive, pervasive, and culturally rooted prejudices 
against persons with mental illness are, serving “ultimately as a 
‘Rorschach test’ for the degree to which we are willing to punish 
people via restrictions of the ability to exercise civil rights 
because they suffer from mental illness.”118 
If we ignore these realities, any attempt to have a constructive 
conversation about the issue of sanism will be doomed to fail. 
D.  Impact of the U.N. Convention 
I indicated earlier that a “cultural relativism defense,” which would 
endorse a perpetuation of the status quo, fails.119 This rejection is not 
simply premised on personal preference or on philosophical position, but 
is also grounded in the law, specifically the new U.N. Convention.120 As 
I noted earlier, the U.N. Convention mandates that nations “[p]rovide 
persons with disabilities with the same range, quality and standard of 
                                                     
116. See generally Perlin, supra note 9; Perlin, Limited, supra note 1. 
117. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
118. Bruce Spector, Disabilities and the Law, 12 BIMONTHLY REV. L. BOOKS, No. 3 (May–June 
2001), at 15, 18, available at http://www.nesl.edu/library/bimonthly/brlb123.doc, permanent copy 
available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n118.pdf. 
119. See supra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
120. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. A/61/106, supra note 3. 
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free or affordable health care and programmes as provided to other 
persons, including in the area of sexual and reproductive health and 
population-based public health programmes.”121 Not insignificantly, the 
U.N. Convention also mandates that such individuals “retain their 
fertility on an equal basis with others.”122 Professors Michael Stein and 
Janet Lord have recently written eloquently about how another Article in 
the U.N. Convention—Article 30, which sets out social rights of 
participation in cultural life—“serves as a vital channel of engagement 
with such society when such participation is embraced by the 
community,” and increases “self-reliance and empowerment.”123 Other 
commentators have concluded that the U.N. Convention “is regarded as 
having finally empowered the ‘world’s largest minority’ to claim their 
rights, and to participate in international and national affairs on an equal 
basis with others who have achieved specific treaty recognition and 
protection.”124 If the U.N. Convention is taken seriously—if it is, in fact, 
more than a “paper victor[y]”125—then perhaps it can be used as a 
vehicle to uproot that aspect of sanism that continues to deny sexual 
rights to institutionalized persons with mental disabilities.126 
                                                     
121. Id. art. 25 (a). 
122. Id. art. 23 (1)(c). 
123. Michael Ashley Stein & Janet Lord, Jacobus tenBroek, Participatory Justice, and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 13 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 167, 182 (2008). I 
discuss this article extensively in Perlin, Wild Cathedral, supra note 82. 
124. Rosemary Kayess & Phillip French, Out of Darkness into Light? Introducing the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (footnotes omitted); see 
also id. at 4 n.17 (citing statements made by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise 
Arbour, and the Permanent Representative of New Zealand and Chair of the Ad-Hoc Committee on 
a Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Ambassador Don Mackay, at a Special Event on the 
Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities, convened by the U.N. Human Rights Council, 
26 March 2007). 
125. Michael L. Perlin, “What’s Good Is Bad, What’s Bad Is Good, You’ll Find out When You 
Reach the Top, You’re on the Bottom”: Are the Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olmstead v. 
L.C.) Anything More Than “Idiot Wind”?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 246 (2002) (quoting 
Michael Lottman, Paper Victories and Hard Realities, in PAPER VICTORIES AND HARD REALITIES: 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED 
93 (Valerie J. Bradley & Gary J. Clarke eds., 1976)). In the specific context of United Nations 
Conventions, see Sara Dillon, What Human Rights Law Obscures: Global Sex Trafficking and the 
Demand for Children, 17 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 154 (2008) (“A specialized human rights 
convention does not in itself guarantee substantial change . . . .”). 
126. There is some evidence that in other jurisdictions, parallel rights are being taken seriously. 
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocol No. 11, Nov. 1, 1998, art. 8(1), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/ 
Treaties/html/005.htm, permanent copy available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/ 
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In summary, the climb uphill is steep. Those seeking fundamental and 
systemic changes in this area need to confront a powerful array of forces 
designed to blunt or subvert change: our tradition of palpable discomfort 
when it comes to even thinking about patient sexuality;127 our fears about 
expanding autonomy rights for any patients in forensic institutions;128 
the tradition in some Asian nations of seeking to suppress all sexual 
behavior on the part of persons with mental disabilities;129 and the 
omnipresence of sanism130 (abetted by pretextuality,131 the use of 
heuristics,132 and the use of false “ordinary common sense”).133 It is my 
hope that this Article calls attention to this cluster of issues so as to 
begin the remediation process. 
IV.  SOME TENTATIVE SOLUTIONS 
It seems futile to offer “solutions” to a problem that most do not even 
realize exists, particularly when most people vehemently reject the 
notion that there is any need for remediation. But I will try. Perhaps 
these thoughts will be of some interest or help.134 I recognize that—in 
and of themselves—my solutions will not eliminate the entire array of 
problems discussed in this Article. But I do believe that if they are 
                                                     
83washlrev481n126.pdf, construed in X. v. Iceland, App. No. 6825/74, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. 
& Rep. 86, 87 (1976) (finding that the Article prohibiting public authorities from interfering with a 
person’s right to respect for his private and family life, his home, and his correspondence is broad 
enough to encompass an entitlement to “establish and to develop relationships with other human 
beings, especially in the emotional field for the development and fulfillment of one’s own 
personality”). This issue is discussed in Lawrence O. Gostin & Lance Gable, The Human Rights of 
Persons with Mental Disabilities: A Global Perspective on the Application of Human Rights 
Principles to Mental Health, 63 MD. L. REV. 20, 94 (2004). 
127. See generally Perlin, Limited, supra note 1. 
128. See generally Perlin, supra note 11 (discussing the overuse of maximum-security facilities 
as sites for evaluations of defendants in incompetency and insanity cases). 
129. See, e.g., Gewirtz, supra note 84; Johnson, supra note 83. 
130. See, e.g., Perlin, On Sanism, supra note 5. 
131. See generally Perlin, supra note 15; Perlin, No Success, supra note 45; Perlin, Pretexts, 
supra note 45. 
132. See, e.g., Perlin, She Breaks, supra note 46. 
133. See Perlin, supra note 15, at 14; Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynamics and the Insanity 
Defense: “Ordinary Common Sense” and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990). 
134. One of these recommendations (the third) applies specifically to forensic issues; another (the 
fifth) applies specifically to issues involving Asian nations (though “cultural relativism” issues are 
certainly raised in human-rights contexts in other nations as well). The rest apply equally to both, as 
well as to the question of patient sexuality in other contexts such as civil hospitals and Western 
nations. 
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implemented, we will begin to make some modest progress, and we will, 
for the first time, treat patients “as human beings.”135 
First, we must take our heads out of the sand and confront the fact 
that institutionalized psychiatric patients—like the rest of us—think 
about sex. (I had originally typed in “all the time,” and then deleted 
it . . . maybe . . . ) It is a fatal error to think otherwise. In one of my 
earlier articles, I shared this vignette from a visit to a psychiatric hospital 
in Uruguay: 
[I] was visiting a ward that, we were told, housed “high-
functioning” teenage males. Some, in fact, were not mentally ill 
at all, but were individuals with physical disabilities who had 
been “dumped” at the institution within a week of being born, 
and had been there ever since. 
I asked a staff member about patient sexuality, and was told, 
“Please! There’s not one of them interested in sex!” We then 
walked into the day room, where a music video was on the TV 
(a far more R-rated video that one might see on MTV or VH-1), 
including a scene of two teenage girls kissing passionately and 
deeply. Judging by the expressions on the boys’ faces, their 
agitation, and their comments to their ward mates, the staff 
member could not have been more wrong.136 
Had the staff acknowledged the reality—that the teenage boys had 
sexual feelings and were expressing normal sexual urges—then the 
institution might have been able to begin to think about structuring 
meaningful sexual-autonomy policies that comport with international 
human-rights norms and standards. 
Second, we must also acknowledge that the great majority of 
residents in such facilities will eventually leave and reenter free society. 
This should force us to think about how repressive sexual policies (or 
non-policies) will affect their behavior in the free world. 
Third, we must come to grips with the extent to which our sanist 
behavior drives our attitudes in these cases. By treating all patients in 
this legal category as if they are likely to be randomly sexually violent—
                                                     
135. Falter v. Veterans’ Admin., 502 F. Supp. 1178, 1185 (D.N.J. 1980). I discuss the 
implications of this opinion for all matters that involve the marginalization of persons with mental 
disabilities in Michael L. Perlin & John Douard, “Equality, I Spoke that Word/As if a Wedding 
Vow”: Mental Disability Law and How We Treat Marginalized Persons, __ N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. __ 
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/wlr/notes/83washlrev481n135. 
pdf. 
136. Perlin, Limited, supra note 1, at 37. 
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ignoring the fact that many forensic patients are charged with minor 
offenses (in some jurisdictions, mere misdemeanors)137—we blind 
ourselves to social realities. 
Fourth, this discourse must consider the therapeutic jurisprudence 
implications of how we treat such patients. I wrote the following fifteen 
years ago, and it still applies: 
We must also question the therapeutic or antitherapeutic 
implications of official hospital policies that control the place, 
manner, and frequency with which such individuals can have 
sexual interactions. We must consider the implications of these 
policies on ward life and their implications for patients’ post-
hospital lives. These questions are difficult ones, but we must 
ask them nonetheless if we wish to formulate a thoughtful, 
comprehensive response to the wide range of questions this 
subject raises.138 
The development of therapeutic jurisprudence as an academic 
discipline139 should force us to consider the therapeutic outcomes of 
different policies about sexual activity. 
Fifth, we must recognize that for these purposes cultural relativism is 
a pretextual sham.140 We must be willing to reject it as a barrier to the 
ability of persons with mental disabilities to exercise their human and 
legal rights. 
Finally, changes in the law, such as the passage of the ADA in the 
United States and the publication of the U.N. Convention, have the 
potential to shift policies governing much of institutional and 
community-based mental disability law. For this to happen, lawyers 
need to start thinking about the underlying issues. So far, this has not 
                                                     
137. See Perlin, supra note 11. 
138. Perlin, supra note 9, at 547. 
139. Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model by which we can assess the ultimate impact 
of case law and legislation on mentally disabled individuals. Therapeutic jurisprudence requires (1) 
studying the role of the law as a therapeutic agent; (2) recognizing that substantive rules, legal 
procedures, and lawyers’ roles may have either therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences; and 
(3) questioning whether such rules, procedures, and roles can or should be reshaped so as to 
enhance their therapeutic potential, while not subordinating due-process principles. See Perlin, She 
Breaks, supra note 46, at 30–31 n.233. See generally ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
(David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991); LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 
1996); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW (Bruce J. 
Winick ed., 1997); THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (David B. 
Wexler ed., 1990). 
140. I discuss pretextuality extensively in PERLIN, supra note 15, and Perlin, supra note 15. 
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happened. My recommendation to my fellow members of the bar is to 
get at it. I have written extensively about how sanism affects lawyers,141 
even lawyers who focus their practices on the representation of 
marginalized persons.142 It is essential that this reality be taken seriously 
by members of the bar, especially those whose practices include 
representation of persons with mental disabilities. 
This list is in no way comprehensive. I offer it here as a modest 
starting point. If we begin to think critically about these issues, it is far 
more likely that we will begin to take seriously the core questions about 
sexuality and autonomy that I pose in this Article. 
CONCLUSION 
I chose Bob Dylan’s “Desolation Row” to use in the title of this 
Article because of its depiction of a “cultural jumble” built on “general 
deviance.”143 The sanism that is shown towards patients in forensic 
facilities and towards patients in Asia, as well as the pretextuality that 
defines the judicial process as it relates to these issues, similarly 
“jumble” mental disability law, confounding and conflating different 
types of social deviance. This creates another desolation row. In one of 
the starkest images in the song, Dylan sings: 
And the only sound that’s left 
After the ambulances go 
Is Cinderella sweeping up 
On Desolation Row[.]144 
In the past four decades, a sexual revolution changed the way we 
think about gender, sex roles, personal relationships, and sexual 
expression. The last thirty years have seen a legal civil-rights revolution 
                                                     
141. On how lawyers are sanist, see Michael L. Perlin, “Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror”: The 
Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 589, 604–05 (2008). See also Aaron Dhir, Relationships of Force: Reflections on Law, 
Psychiatry, and Human Rights, 25 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 103, 108 (2008) (“[T]he 
primary responsibility for the lack of rights realization lies not with judges, not with legislators and 
not with clinicians. Rather, it lies with us - the lawyers who represent, and will go on to represent, 
persons with psychiatric disabilities.”). 
142. See Perlin, supra note 141, at 590 (“Just as lawyers are sanist towards clients with mental 
disabilities, they are sanist towards their peers with mental disabilities.”); Perlin, Lepers, supra note 
1, at 700 (“Even a cursory examination of the ethical issues permeating the representation of 
persons with mental disabilities readily evidences the omnipresence of sanism.”). 
143. Kermode & Spender, supra note 21, at 158–59. 
144. BobDylan.com, supra note 17. 
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affect the way that we think about persons with mental disabilities, both 
in institutional and community settings.145 The last twenty years have 
seen a revolution in the joining together of the international human-
rights movement and the mental disability law movement.146 Perhaps we 
can now turn our attention to the relationship between these two 
revolutions. If we can do so, then there will be more to this area of the 
law than, simply, another “desolation row.” 
 
                                                     
145. Perlin, supra note 9, at 547. 
146. See, e.g., PERLIN, HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37; Perlin & Szeli, supra note 82. 
